Implementing this recommendation was no small task, and involved hundreds of personnel from NASA, Boeing, The United Space Alliance, and other organizations. Establish impact damage thresholds that trigger responsive corrective action, such as on-orbit inspection and repair, when indicated 1. These tools should provide realistic and timely estimates of any impact damage from possible debris from any source that may ultimately impact the Orbiter. It reads:ĭevelop, validate, and maintain physics-based computer models to evaluate Thermal Protection System damage from debris impacts. One of these recommendations, R3.8-2, addressed the need for computer models to evaluate thermal protection system damage that may result from debris impact. During the course of the investigation, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) made a number of recommendations, which NASA agreed to implement before returning the Shuttle fleet to flight.
An extensive investigation into the accident was conducted in the ensuing months and identified that foam debris-induced damage to the reinforced-carbon-carbon wing, leading edge thermal protection system was the most probable root cause of the failure. On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Orbiter Columbia suffered catastrophic structural failure during reentry, tragically killing all seven crewmembers on board.